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The Causal Relationship between Auditor Turnover and Audit Fees 
-Evidence in Japan 
ABSTRACT  
This study investigates the causal relationship between auditor turnover and audit fees. The aim of 
this study is to accurately identify the real relationship between auditor turnover and audit fees. The 
analysis in this study is based on the counterfactual model provided by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983). The propensity score is estimated using logistic regression, which generates a matched 
treatment sample and a control (counterfactual) sample. The matched dataset containing 486 
firm-years is analyzed using liner regression to identify the causal relationship between auditor 
change and audit fees. The clearly significant result shows that low-balling exists in real audit 
contracts. As an additional study, the sample is divided using the auditor size variable (Dummy of 
Big 3 or not) into four parts. The additional results show that, after an auditor change from a 
Non-Big 3 auditor to Big 3 auditor, the contract exhibits low-balling. This suggests that clients who 
change auditors from a non-Big 3 firm to Big 3auditor do not receive an adequate audit because of 
the auditors' cost cutting. 
The coefficient of the auditor change from non-Big3 to Big 3 auditor is significant and relatively 
higher than the coefficients of the other parts. Audit fees need to cover the costs of the audit practice 
to maintain audit quality. The results of this study can serve as an alert for Japanese auditing practice 
quality issues. 
 
 1. Introduction 
Generally, auditors seeking new clients are frequently discounting their fees for the 
first-time audit. This price cutting phenomena is called “low-balling.” DeAngelo (1981) is the first 
analytical study of this phenomenon and is observed in many aspects of economic relationships. This 
first-time price cutting is not confined to auditing; as such, there is a need to expand our research. 
For example, Roychowdhury (2006) examines earnings management using price cutting (“sales 
manipulation”). 1 The expected future quasi-rents induce this initial price cutting by auditors. 
Quasi-rents, which refer to the excess of revenues in a period over avoidable costs (including the 
opportunity cost of auditing), is a very complicated concept. Simply speaking the auditor will benefit 
from the quasi-rents when becoming the incumbent. Lack of auditor independency will decrease the 
audit fees.  
A contrary theory to low-balling, where the audit fee for the first-time auditing will be 
higher than other periods because the auditor will manage the risk associated with taking on new 
client companies, should be examined. Auditors will require high-level audit fees to cover these 
additional risk adjusting activities (Simunic 1980). This opinion from Simunic also indicates that 
other factors associated with these higher fees should be considered, such as auditing firm size, 
auditor reputation.  
                                                   
1 However, the sales manipulation in real earnings management is to take the cash flow in short 
term. 
This study formulates two opposing theoretical hypotheses for analyzing the state of audit 
fees with a change from the incumbent auditor.  
Mandatory auditor rotation has emerged as a popular accounting topic in the current 
decade. Effective June 2016, the European Union adopted legislation for mandatory audit firm rotate. 
In addition, in Japanese audit market, from 2004 the rules of standard audit pricing is abundant. The 
new environment may give something new to the audit contract respectively.  
This study confirms the effect of auditor turnover by setting up a treatment effect using 
the Neyman-Rubin “Potential Outcomes Framework” to develop the empirical results. The 
relationship between regression and causal effect analysis is presented in Graph 1.  
The significance of the proposed research is to show the causal relationship between 
auditor turnover and level of audit fees. In the previous studies, the researchers only demonstrated 
the correlation of the two phenomena. This study provides evidence that auditor turnover is not only 
correlated, but also causes the changes in audit fees. Theoretically, the initial audit fees reduction 
(low-balling) will be introduced at the first-time auditing. DeAngelo (1981) insists that an 
auditor’s independency is impaired with low-balling; however, she does not show the empirical 
evidence in her thesis. Deis and Giroux (1996) provide some evidence but low-balling has not been 
observed in Japan until this proposed work. This study conjectures whether low-balling is observable, 
and if so, under what settings.  
Auditor independency is very beneficial and essential to an audit practice. However, Deis 
and Giroux (1996) suggest that a low-balling (low-independence, in this audit) setting does not 
correlate to a low-quality audit. The quality of audit is maintained even if low-balling is observed. 
For this research, the exact cause of the low-balling, if observable, needs to be defined. Low-balling 
has been evidenced in many industries and economic relationships. 
This paper is organized as follows: First, previous works regarding audit fees and 
independency are reviewed. Next, the research design is provided, followed by the data analysis 
details and results. Finally, the conclusions, implications, and limitations of this study are presented. 
2. Background and Previous Works 
The theoretical research of DeAngelo (1981) is the first research regarding low-balling 
relating to auditors. She elucidates the theoretical background of low-balling and insists that 
low-balling is not connected to impairment of auditor independency. 2 The quasi-rent will be 
awarded to the selected auditor; therefore, auditors conduct low-balling to win the bid. The strong 
independency induces the benefit between auditor and client companies. Simon and Francis (1988) 
analyze the real conditions of low-balling and their relationships to auditor independence. 
                                                   
2 Tseng, R. P. M. M. C. (1990) is another analytical study for seeing “first audit effects (effects of 
incumbency)”. They say the effects of incumbency will damage the independency of auditors. 
 
Casterella et al. (2004) show the correlation between audit fees and auditor specialization. 
Their findings reveal that premiums paid for auditor specialization only relate to smaller clients. 
Carcello et al., Nagy (2005) also find the audit quality remediates for only small clientele after the 
clients will change their auditor from Arthur Andersen. In contrast with this research, Deis and 
Giroux (1996) conclude that audit quality is not changed after an auditor turnover. 
Abbott et al. (2003) see a positive relationship between audit fees and audit committee 
characteristics (independence, financial expertise, and meeting frequency). 
Carcello and Neal (2000) provide some evidence of a relationship between audit 
committee composition and going concern opinion. They suggest that the probability of adding the 
going concern opinion will be lesser when some affiliated audit committee members are part of the 
committee. They selected 223 samples for the test (from only select financially distressed 
companies), which supported their hypothesis. 
Carcello and Neal (2003) added some evidence to their previous study (Carcello and 
Neal, 2000) and showed the relationship between auditor dismissal and audit committee 
characteristics. They suggest that the auditor will be protected by the audit committee even if the 
auditor discloses unfavorable financial situations (such as going concern issues) when audit 
committee members are independent from company managers or the board of directors. Their study 
shows the expected result that independent audit committee members protect the external auditor 
from dismissal. 
Evidence exists that shows that internal company conditions will affect the external audit 
and that audit fees correlate with auditor independence. Out of the ordinary or atypical (too large or 
too small) audit fees may also relate to auditor independence. Though evidence can be shown of the 
effect of damaged auditor independence, this study shows the impact of the auditor-management 
internal condition on the external audit.  
 The independence of the auditor with respect to its first audit changes relative to other 
auditors. Hence, this study states two opposing hypotheses on auditor independence. The null 
hypotheses are as follows, 
H1. The audit fees will not be higher-level with a turnover in auditor due to the auditor’s risk 
adjustment than the others.  
H2. The audit fees will not be low-level with a change in auditor because of lack of independency.  
 
3. Research Design 
Data Category  
This study categorizes the auditor turnover data as follows: 
1． Full sample 
2． Big 3 auditor to Big 3 auditor 
3． Big 3 auditor to non-Big 3 auditor 
4． Non-Big 3 auditor to Big 3 auditor 
5． Non-Big 3 auditor to non-Big 3 auditor 
I just confirm the full sample case as a main study. First, I conduct the full sample analysis using 
single regression. Then, following Hoshino (2009), I run a multiple regression. 
Analysis policy 
Causality, not just correlation, will be generated from the regression analysis. This analysis 
requires the use of counterfactual data and uses propensity score matching. Why we need to see the 
causality? Correlation does not prove causality; however, correlation is a part of causality. David 
Hume3 suggests that we cannot always observe causality but it exists in the real world. We have 
known that we can see the causality if we reproduce the effect of treatment. This approach is based 
on the Neyman-Rubin counterfactual model. 
To ensure accurate results regarding the causality, this study selected the propensity 
matching approach.  
Data 
                                                   
3I refer to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (available on 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/).  
 
1) This study selects samples that contain data from Japanese listed companies, and exclude 
financial institutions 
2) exclude double-listed Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or other stock markets in 
foreign country 
3) exclude the samples which conduct joint audit 
4) include only the sample fiscal year end is March 
5) include necessary data from databases 
This study generates data from the Nikkei Data CD-ROM and Nikkei Kigyo Kihon Data. To exclude 
the effects of internal control audit bubble, I collect data from March 2011 to March 2016. I have 
observed the 10,919 firm-year observations and those of the switching firm under 243.  
 
Model 
Most studies use the regression model and only observe correlations, which is not adequate 
for investigating accurate and real conditions.  
This study uses the following logistic regression model for formulating the propensity 
score.  
 
CHA =
𝛼𝛼0＋𝛼𝛼1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋𝛼𝛼3𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿＋𝛼𝛼4𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺＋𝛼𝛼5𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3＋𝛼𝛼6𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋𝑦𝑦𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦＋𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦＋ε                   
                                              （equation 1） 
This model consists of the determinants of auditor turnover. 
The determinants shown above are the characteristics of auditees. The results are represented on 
Table 2. In the model, I have identified the auditee’s size and associated risks as well as the 
following variables: 
(1) Size Variable: Natural Logarithm of Total Assets 
An auditee’s size is the basic characteristic. Sizable auditees incur higher audit costs and 
auditor charges determine auditor change. In fact, this study includes the variables and examines the 
complexity of the operation (Simunic 1980) in the model; however, the correlation between these 
two factors is very high. Therefore, I have excluded the complexity variable from the analysis as the 
characteristic of the auditee.  
(2) Inherent Risk: Level of Receivables, Inventory, and Leverage 
Inherent risk reveals the potential risks to companies. I have selected receivables, 
inventory, and leverage. Higher accounting receivables and inventory potentially expose the auditee 
to more risky conditions, and high leverage instigates detrimental conditions in companies. This 
study refers to the work of Simunic (1980), which is an audit pricing study focusing on auditors’ 
characteristics for determining audit fees.  
 (3) Default Risk: Going Concern Opinion Dummy Variables 
The default is a basic concern for the auditor that can lead to his relinquishing his role. The 
going concern opinion reveals financial distress, and therefore, this factor is not connected to the 
default directly. 
(4) Auditor size: Big 3 or not dummy variables 
 Auditor size is very important in auditor selection. Essentially, the Big3 firms in Japan 
(AZSA KPMG LLP, EY Shinnihon LLP, and Deloitte Tohmatsu LLP) have strong brand power and 
prior studies confirm this (e.g., Oikawa 2013). I have observed the differences between the Big3 and 
non-Big3 firms, and based on the results have divided the samples.  
(5) Internal Control Risk: Rate of Growth of Sales 
I have focused on the internal controls of high-growth companies, based on the Committee 
of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) framework 19924. A company 
that has an excessive growth rate poses an internal control risk. Since fiscal year 2009, internal 
control reporting is mandated for all the listed and big companies. This study necessarily examines 
internal control risks. If this logic is applied, a material weakness dummy variable is needed. 
However, companies exhibiting material weakness are not included in the examined sample. 
 
                                                   
4 The COSO Internal Control framework was updated on 2013. However, I see the basic concept on 
1992 framework. 
(Table 2 here) 
While the full sample analysis did not present any problems, the divided samples did with 
regard to matching. Therefore, I have shown the results of the full sample with divided dummy 
variables and full sample result. 
4. Results 
This study observes the relationship between audit fees and auditor turnover and clarifies 
that auditors discount their fees for the first audit.  
Descriptive statistic and correlation 
Table 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistic and correlation. There are 243 matched 
samples. I matched the samples using one to one nearest neighborhood matching. See the Graph 2 
and Table 2 for the details of matching 
The treatment sample’s audit fees are little bit smaller than the control sample’s audit fees. 
In addition, the treatment sample received Going Concern Opinion more very often and growth of 
sales is bigger. For GC variables and the growth of sales variables are not able to be matched 
between the two groups. The other variables are almost same between treatment sample and control 
sample. 
(Table 3 and 4 here) 
Regarding the correlation, I cannot recognize significantly higher correlation number, so 
do not concern about multicollinearity.  
 (Graph 2 here) 
 
 
Main Analysis 
The final examination model is as follows, 
LNAF＝𝛼𝛼0＋𝛼𝛼１𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿＋𝜀𝜀 (equation 2) 
LNAF = 𝛼𝛼0＋𝛼𝛼１𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿＋𝛼𝛼2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋𝛼𝛼3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋𝛼𝛼4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅＋𝛼𝛼5𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺＋𝛼𝛼6𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3 
＋𝛼𝛼7𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋ε （equation 3） 
This analysis sets up auditor turnover as a treatment sample, and estimates the propensity 
scores. I matched the treatment sample with the control sample using propensity scores. Hoshino 
(2009) states that multi-regression analysis using matched data by propensity score is the method 
used by some medical studies. This research is based on the method introduced by Hoshino (2009).  
This analysis is conducted using full sample. The full sample analysis shows a highly 
significant causal relationship between audit fees and auditor turnover in multiple regression model. 
However, single regression is not shown significant results. I think the endogeneity of the model is 
modified by the control variable. The control variable is significant at appropriate level on the 
multiple model.               
(Table 5 and 6 here) 
 
5. Interpretation of the results 
The level of audit fees is lower than control samples. This indicates the same condition as 
DeAngelo. This result is important because audit cost is not covered by the audit fees completely.5  
  Low-balling may have become prevalent after the introduction of the internal control 
reporting institution (based on the Company Law and the Financial Instruments Exchange Law), the 
extent of which varies with auditor size. Had I rejected the Big3 dummy variable from the model, 
the result would have changed (not tabulated). To investigate the details of the effects of the Big3 
dummy variables, I have divided the sample and have analyzed it in depth. 
6.  Additional analysis using categorical dummy variables 
This analysis provides the details of the effects of the auditor change seeing Big3 or not 4 
                                                   
5 This analysis cannot provide evidence to prove whether auditor independence gets eroded. We can 
observe auditor independence using methods like discretionally accruals. However, these methods 
are not accurate. To examine audit quality or independence, we need to analyze the real process of 
audit, which involves substantial procedures, using real audit data. 
 
pattern variables (b. to e.).6  
LNAF = 𝛼𝛼0＋𝛼𝛼１𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3＋𝛼𝛼2𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3＋𝛼𝛼3𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3＋𝛼𝛼4𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3 
＋𝛼𝛼5𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋𝛼𝛼6𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋𝛼𝛼7𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅＋𝛼𝛼8𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺＋𝛼𝛼9𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿3＋𝛼𝛼10𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿＋ε 
 (equation 4) 
b. The analysis using auditor data changed from the Big 3 to Big3 
  Big 3 to Big3 samples suggest insignificant results. This suggests that the Big3 to Big3 
line does not affect audit fees. Big3 to Big3 poses some problems, and therefore, clients see no 
advantage in hiring an auditor, who has to be paid some audit fees. This insignificance shows that 
the auditee needs to compromise and the auditor has the advantage of earning some audit fees. 
c.  The analysis using auditor data changed from the Big3 to non-Big3 
Big3 to non-Big3 data is not significant, suggesting that non-Big3 firms charge the same 
audit fees from all client companies. There is no change in the results. Generally, Big 3 firm require 
the higher level of audit fees and this analysis suggest the same results (See the Big3 coefficient) 
however non-Big 3 firm requires the same amount of fees. It suggests risk adjustment is occurred.  
d.  The analysis using auditor data changed from the non-Big 3 to Big3 
                                                   
6 This study provides matching samples for four parts (using the Big3 dummy), but some of their 
probabilities are either 0 or 1. Therefore, I do not generate the matched samples for each category.  
 
 Non-Big3 to Big3 data is highly significant. It shows that high-growth companies have the 
advantage of determining the audit contract and requesting the auditor to discount his or her fees. 
This result shows the low-quality audit will be conducted in these samples. In fact, as the Big3 audit 
firms have internal system rigidly, a proportion of the expenses will be covered by the non-additional 
costs (with the auditee’s rapid growth). 
e.  The analysis using auditor data changed from the non- Big 3 to non- Big3 
This data set shows not significant results of the relationship between the audit fees and 
auditor turnover. When non-Big3 sample moves to another non-big firm, client company required to 
pay same fees. I conjecture that this type is not associated with the discount or risk adjustment of 
audit fees. 
(Table 7.1 and 7.2 here)  
 
 
7.  Conclusion 
This study investigates the causal relationship between auditor turnover and audit pricing. 
Specifically, the black box regarding auditor turnover has been resolved in this study. The black box 
of auditor turnover either diminishes auditor independence, which decreases the level of audit fees, 
or it places auditors at additional risk, which increases the level of audit fees. Both these scenarios 
are theoretically possible. These hypotheses have been tested using an accurate method that provides 
the causal inference between auditor turnover and audit fees and produces counter-factual samples to 
compare the facts (treatment samples) and analyze the relationship between the two sample groups. 
This study constructs a matching database and conducts re-regression using the matched sample. 
Hoshino (2009) suggests this approach is popular in some medical studies.  
 The results of our analysis are clear; audit fees is low level when the auditor changes. 
These results make it easy to interpret real-life conditions. So, H2 is rejected. 
 This study only shows a causal relationship, and does not help interpret the length of 
tenure of auditors. Johnson et. al. (2002) show the incomplete results of the relationship between 
auditors’ tenure and audit quality. We need to replicate the findings of Johnson et. al. (2002) 
regarding the use of audit fees. According to the authors, a medium length of audit tenure positively 
correlates with the audit quality. They denied the possibility that auditor rotation is effective in 
maintaining audit quality. The European Union’s assumptions may not be the same as the research 
outlook in this study or as the assumptions in Johnson et. al.’s (2002) study. The European Union’s 
perception is that “mandatory rotation” will result in the achievement of high-quality audit. The 
competitive condition of auditors emerged from the 2004 de-regulation of the “standard audit fees 
rule” in Certified Public Accountant (CPA) law. The competition between auditors may be more 
intense than in the 2004–2011 fiscal-years because of the end of the internal control-bubble and 
some cases of scandal-related accounting. A decline in audit fees results in low-quality audits. 
Although audit fees consist of other components, a large proportion of it goes toward workers’ costs. 
In addition, on the analytical policy, I do not have used adequate treated samples making 
the 4-divided sample (using Big3 or not dummy variables). Moreover, I just see the low-balling in 
limited samples. This kind of study must enlarge the samples and confirm more accurate audit 
quality changes when the auditor turnovers.  
The mandatory auditor rotation will be the big issue in the audit market from now on. 
Changing auditors has many reasons in the selective change of auditor. So, the basic situation is not 
same with mandatory rotation, but low-cost audit may be emerged with rotation by low-balling and 
low quality audit may be occurred. The turnover issue is the big and important one in this audit 
market. 
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Table and Graphs 
Table 1 Definition of variables 
Variables                                                 Definition  
CHA = 
1 in case of auditor turnover and a brand-new audit firm signs a contract with a sample client, 
otherwise 0. 
LNAsset = Natural logarithm of audit fees 
Leverage = Total liability on total asset 
InvRec = Inventory and accounting receivable on total asset 
GC = 1 if manager declares going concern opinion, otherwise 0. 
Big3 = 1 if the audit firm is AZSA KPMG LLP, EY Shinnihon LLP, or Deloitte Tohmatsu LLP, otherwise 0. 
Dsales = (Salest – Salest-1) on Salest-1 
Big3toBig3 = 1 if the audit firm is changed from one Big3 firm to another, otherwise 0. 
Big3toNonBig3 = 1 if the audit firm is changed from a Big3 firm to a non-Big3 firm, otherwise 0. 
NonBig3toBig3 = 1 if the audit firm is changed from a non-Big3 firm to a Big3 firm, otherwise 0. 
NonBig3toNonBig3 = 1 if the audit firm is changed from one non-Big3 firm to another, otherwise 0. 
Yeardummy = Year dummy variable 
Inddummy = Industry dummy variable 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Logistic Regression Results: For estimating the propensity scores 
DV=CHA  ［-/+］  Coeff.  Z-value 
Intercept  -0.7161 -1.004 
LNAsset  -  -0.273    -5.368*** 
Leverage  +  0.716  2.163* 
InvRec  +  -0.917  -2.169* 
GC  +  -0.121  -0.320 
Big3  -  -1.788   -11.517** 
Dsales  +  0.096  1.538 
Yeardummy   Included    - 
Industrydummy  Included     
Number of Obs.=                10,919 
Treatment sample Obs.=           243 
AIC=                          2102.2 
  
This table represents the result of logistic regression analysis for estimating the propensity scores. The 
significance of coefficients is shown that *** is 0.1 percent level, ** is 1 percent level, * is 5 percent 
level, and ‘. is 10 percent level. The definitions of variables are on the Table 1. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics (n=486) 
  Minimum  Maximum  Average  Standard Deviation 
                 
  Treat  Control  Treat  Control  Treat  Control  Treat  Control 
LNAF  1.609  2.197  5.215  4.804  3.189  3.258  0.516  0.478 
LNAsset  6.006  4.844  14.739  13.945  9.835  9.783  1.555  1.490 
Leverage  0.053  0.043  1.231  1.535  0.521  0.498  0.213  0.224 
InvRec  0  0  0.720  0.779  0.216  0.202  0.172  0.175 
GC  0  0  1  1  0.040  0.020  0.199  0.156 
Big3  0  0  1  1  0.260  0.270  0.441  0.446 
Dsales  -0.590  -0.855  24.786  1.218  0.142  0.042  1.608  0.206 
This table shows the descriptive statistics of the propensity matched sample. ‘Treat’ means treatment sample that auditor’s turnover is 
happened, and ‘Control’ means the control samples matched using propensity scores. Regarding the definition of the variable you can see them 
on the Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4 
Correlation (n=486) 
  CHA LNAF LNAsset Leverage InvRev GC Big3 Dsales 
LNAF -0.069 1 
      
LNAsset 0.017 0.663 1 
     
Leverage 0.052 -0.005 -0.044 1 
    
InvRec 0.040 0.026 0.041 0.062 1 
   
GC 0.046 -0.129 -0.302 0.122 -0.099 1 
  
Big3 -0.009 0.311 0.238 -0.084 0.005 -0.111 1 
 
Dsales 0.044 -0.059 0.054 0.083 -0.054 -0.031 -0.015 1 
This table represents the correlation between variables. The definitions of variables are on the Table 1. 
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Table 5 
Liner Regression Result: Single regression using matched sample.  
DV=LNAF  ［-/+］  Coeff.  Std. Error  t-value 
(Intercept)  3.258     0.032 102.113***  
CHA  ?   -0.069      0.045   -1.527  
Number of Obs.=                       486 
Multiple R-squared=                       0.005  
  Adjusted R-squared =                     0.003 
F-statistic =                              2.333 
    
This table represents the result of liner regression analysis using the propensity scores matched sample. 
The significance of coefficients is shown that *** is 0.1 percent level, ** is 1 percent level, * is 5 percent 
level, and ‘ is 10 percent level. The definitions of variables are on the Table 1. 
 
Table 6 
Linear Regression Results: Multiple regression using matched sample 
DV=LNAF  ［-/+］  Coeff.  Std. Error  t-value 
(Intercept)   1.054 0.121 8.695*** 
CHA       ?    -0.081   0.033  -2.459* 
LNAsset     +     0.215   0.012  18.614*** 
Leverage     +     0.089   0.076  1.175 
InvRec     +     0.008   0.095  0.080 
GC      +     0.233   0.097  2.397* 
Big3      +     0.185   0.038   4.868*** 
Dsales    +    -0.039   0.014  -2.702** 
Number of Obs.=                     486 
Multiple R-squared=                     0.487  
  Adjusted R-squared =                    0.479  
F-statistic =                           64.68*** 
    
This table represents the result of liner regression analysis using the propensity scores matched sample. This 
analysis used the same variables in the first logistic regression. The significance of coefficients is shown that 
*** is 0.1 percent level, ** is 1 percent level, * is 5 percent level, and ‘ is 10 percent level. The definitions of 
variables are on the Table 1. 
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Table 7.1 The number of divided samples 
Big3toBig3  35 
Big3toNonBig3  61 
NonBig3toBig3  29 
NonBig3toNonBig3 118 
         Total            243 
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Table 7.2  Additional Analysis 
Liner Regression using the divided samples   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DV=LNAF  ［-/+］  Coeff.  Std. Error  t-value 
(Intercept)   1.034 0.123    8.438 *** 
Big3toBig3  ?  -0.048  0.076  -0.638 
Big3toNonBig3  ?  -0.067  0.053  -1.264 
NonBig3toBig3  ?  -0.267  0.081     -3.303 ** 
NonB3toNonB3  ?  -0.051  0.043  -1.201 
LNAsset     +  0.215  0.012     18.662 *** 
Leverage     +  0.095  0.076  1.243 
InvRec     +  0.038  0.096  0.393 
GC      +  0.230  0.097   2.375 * 
Big3      +  0.230  0.053     4.367 *** 
Dsales    +  -0.040  0.014   - 2.770 ** 
Number of Obs.=                     486 
Multiple R-squared=                     0.494  
  Adjusted R-squared =                    0.484  
F-statistic =                           46.43*** 
    
This table represents the result of liner regression analysis using the propensity scores matched sample. On this 
analysis I divided the sample of CHA to the 4 parts. The definitions of variables are on the Table 1. The 
significance of coefficients is shown that *** is 0.1 percent level, ** is 1 percent level, * is 5 percent level, and . 
is 10 percent level.  
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Graph 1:  Outline of research 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The above graph shows the outline of this study. The basic concept is from the causal inference 
framework. 
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Graph2: Propensity Score Matching Details  
  
 
 
The above 4 histogram shows the matching result. This “Raw Control” histogram is changed like “Matched Control”. 
 
